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FRAMING CONTESTS AND CUMULATION 
IN INSTITUTIONAL EMERGENCE: 
THE CASE OF THE DIESEL PARTICULATE FILTER IN GERMANY1 
ABSTRACT 
Based on an in-depth case study, this paper examines how framing contests between 
proponents and opponents of the Diesel particulate filter (DPF) in Germany evolve over time 
to affect institution creation. Our results suggest that the emergence of institution passes 
through three cumulative phases: necessary opening, organizing-mobilizing, 
instrumentalization of channels. This development is characterized by specific framing 
contests where the precedent phase is a necessary condition for the next to occur, a process 
which we conceptualize as cumulation. Our data indicate that framing contests were resolved 
when collective action frames which have a motivational task were crafted by the social 
movement with the effect of mobilizing customers, thereby creating a de facto standard i.e. 
the Diesel particulate filter. We argue that the motivational frame resonated because it 
features negative individualized evidence-based consequences and because it built on the 
framing contests of previous phases. Finally, we observed that framing contests tend to 
polarize over time, thereby reflecting the intensity of the conflict. 
KEYWORDS 
Framing contest, institution emergence, social movement, collective action frame, 
polarization, phases, cumulation mechanism. 
 
 
1 We thank Peer Fiss, Sarah Kaplan, Ann Langley, Michael Lounsbury, David Seidl and participants in the 2010 EGOS 
subtheme on Institutional change, organizational restructuring and new kinds of social actors in a globalizing world for 
their helpful comments on earlier renderings of the data and ideas in this paper. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of novel institutions is one of the major forces which enables societal change 
and is an important theme in organizational theory (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005). 
Institutions do not only emerge because they constitute appropriate answers to local problems 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1996), they may also arise from intensive collective struggles where actors 
combine their efforts to raise armies of activists ready to challenge existing institutions and 
propose new ones. There is a growing body of literature which acknowledges that social 
movements can play an important role in institution creation (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). 
For example, social movement activities were found to be a powerful motor to shift 
institutional logic in professional settings (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Rao, 
Monin, & Durand, 2003), to create new organizational forms (Rao, 1998; Rao, Morrill, & 
Zald, 2000) and to create new markets (King & Pearce, 2010; Sine & Lee, 2009; Weber, 
Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008). 
Fundamentally, social movements need to mobilize actors and resources in order to change a 
given situation. At the same time, those who resist the proposed change need to organize to 
protect the status quo. One of the main and most powerful tool activists can use to attack 
opponents are collective action frames, i.e. rationales to mobilize activists (Benford & Snow, 
2000). Resisters on the other hand, engage and mobilize defensive arguments. Through 
collective action frames, activists, resisters and other parties may engage in struggles over 
meaning, i.e. what the social movement literature calls framing contests (Benford & Snow, 
2000). Yet most of the studies in this literature focus on the framing activities of the 
movement (Davis et al., 2005; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996) without explicitly looking 
at the resistance and the counter-framing activities of the parties under attack (e.g. Rao et al., 
2003; Schneiberg & Soule, 2005; Sine & Lee, 2009; Weber et al., 2008 and see also the 
comment of Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006) or, when they have done so, their analysis has 
3 
3/60 
been more static than processual (e.g., Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 
2005). Consequently, little empirical research has explicitly looked at the framing activities 
deployed by both the proponents and opponents of new norms or standards and how framing 
contests evolve and unfold over time to enable the emergence of novel institutions. 
Furthermore, this gap does not seem idiosyncratic to the social movement literature as similar 
criticisms have been formulated about the institutional entrepreneurship literature. As Hardy 
and Maguire (2008) and Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) remark, most studies of the 
institutional entrepreneurship literature have tended to use actor-centric analysis where the 
voices of institutional entrepreneurs have been prominently heard and where the resistance of 
those under fire has been mainly overlooked. 
In order to explore how framing contests evolve over time to enable institutional change, we 
conducted an in-depth longitudinal case study analysis. We chose the case of the Diesel 
particulate filter (DPF) in Germany because it features extremely dichotomized parties having 
incompatible institutional goals, namely the car industry and the environmental movement in 
Germany. The case is characterized by the mobilization of 97 social movement organizations 
which were requesting the German car manufacturers to equip Diesel cars with DPF in order 
to reduce pollution. This gave rise to intense framing contests where manufacturers largely 
resisted the proposition of the environmental movement to make the DPF a de facto standard 
(Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997; Kim & Pennings, 2009) i.e. a standard which is not 
imposed through regulation but emerges bottom-up, for Diesel cars in Germany. Our analysis 
focuses on how struggles between collective action frames, elaborated by the proponents and 
opponents to the DPF becoming a de facto standard, evolved over time and how a new 
institution such as a de facto standard emerges. 
By comparing collective action frames of both parties involved in framing contests, this study 
contributes to the literature in three ways. Firstly, our results suggest that the emergence of 
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institution passes through three cumulative phases where the precedent phase is a necessary 
condition for the next to happen. The first phase, necessary openings, concerns the 
elaboration of collective action frames accomplishing diagnostic (identifying a problem) and 
prognostic tasks (identifying a solution). The second phase, organizing-mobilizing, 
corresponds to the formation of environmental coalitions which provide legitimacy for further 
framing contests. The third phase, instrumentalization of channels, is characterized by the 
crafting of frames having a motivational task (rationale to engage in a movement) with the 
effect of mobilizing consumers and creating a de facto standard i.e. the Diesel particulate 
filter. Secondly, we argue that the motivational frame resonates with consumers because it 
features negative individualized consequences and because it occurred after the necessary 
conditions for a war over the emergence of a new institution were established. Thirdly, our 
results suggest that frames develop over time and become increasingly evocative and extreme, 
a phenomenon which we call frame polarization, as framing contests within the first phases do 
not lead to intended institutional emergence.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first describe the theoretical 
background of our study. We then explain the research context, the scope and the 
methodology of this research. This is followed by a chronological presentation of the case 
study, drawing particular attention to the framing contests which unfolded on both sides of the 
interaction. The next section analyses the framing activities of the proponents and the 
opponents to the DPF. We terminate this paper with a discussion on the theoretical 
implications of our findings. 
FRAMING CONTESTS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INSTITUTION 
Originally borrowed from Goffman (1974), a frame is a schema of interpretation which helps 
in understanding events and objects surrounding us. Snow and Benford (1988) adapted this 
term to make it fit the social movement literature and created the term collective action frame 
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which, like Goffman’s concept, still performs an interpretative function, but is “intended to 
mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize 
antagonists” (Snow & Benford, 1988: 198). From this perspective, framing is a strategic 
process which may lead to frames i.e. the “outcome[s] of negotiated meaning” (Gamson, 
1992). It is the “conscious strategic efforts by group of people to fashion shared 
understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” 
(Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). This is the definition which we adopt for this 
study.  
While the concept of framing has been mainly used in the social movement literature to 
explain strategies for acquiring resources, recruiting new members or mobilizing adherents 
(Benford & Snow, 2000; McAdam et al., 1996; McCarthy & Zald, 1977), there is recent 
interest in understanding how social movement affects institutional change (Hardy & Maguire, 
2008; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). These works are largely based on the assumption that 
societies are so complex and heterogeneous (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Friedland & Alford, 
1991) that there is wide scope for conflict to arise and for actors to engage in wars over 
signification. While most of the literature on social movement documents the action of 
movement against the State (King & Pearce, 2010), several other actors such as professionals, 
key suppliers, consumers and other organizations may also engage in framing activities and 
shape institution creation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, if the framing activities of 
several actors having divergent interests collide, framing contests may ensue. Building on 
previous work (e.g. Kaplan, 2008), we define framing contest as the struggle over meaning 
which attempts to influence the interpretative schemes of actors involved in a given situation. 
Much of the literature on social movement which mobilizes the concept of framing contest 
has attempted to document the creation of different types of institutions ranging from 
promoting new organizational forms (Schneiberg & Soule, 2005), endorsing new markets 
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(Sine & Lee, 2009; Weber et al., 2008), shaping identity (Greenwood et al., 2002; Markowitz, 
2007; Rao et al., 2003), forging new institutional logics (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010), legitimating 
products (Rao, 2002) and new practices (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004), and even the 
emergence of technological standards (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002). All these studies 
assume that framing contests are a central mechanism leading to institution creation but none 
of them explicitly documents how struggles over meaning evolve over time by simultaneously 
looking at both sides of the interaction, i.e. little attention is paid to the response of the 
opponents. For example, Weber (2008) shows how the social movement contested the current 
meat and dairy product system by proposing to produce grass-fed meat and dairy products. 
Their work examines in great detail the frames developed by activists which led to the 
creation of the grass-fed beef market. While this study is exemplary in many respects, it does 
not examine opponents’ reactions to the attack of the social movement. Another example is 
the in-depth examination of public attention to Clinton’s health care reform initiative by 
Nigam and Ocasio (2010) which proposes that “as event attention leads to new forms of 
representation of the environment, new forms of theorization emerge, and as these new forms 
of theorization and representation become aligned with newly emergent field-level practices, 
they develop into a dominant institutional logic” (p.824). While these authors develop a 
model of how new institutional logics become dominant, their analysis focuses mainly on the 
framing activities of the proponents of the new institution. 
While these studies look at only one side of the interaction, others explicitly compare the 
framing and counter-framing activities of protagonists engaged in struggles over meaning, but 
their analysis is static, either leaving the dynamic of framing contests over time aside or 
presenting two competing frames which do not interrelate. These studies investigated how 
social movement, social entrepreneurs and framing contests promote new organizational 
forms (Rao, 1998; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) or shape identity (Creed et al., 2002). For 
example, Rao (1998) looks at how competing entrepreneurs mobilized incompatible collective 
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action frames in an attempt to legitimize the organizational form which they promoted. 
However, the analysis of these frames occurs in parallel. Another example is the exhaustive 
study of Creed et al. (2002) which shows how the master frames available in the environment 
are mobilized in framing to create legitimating accounts. Perhaps the only exception to this 
situation is the work of Kaplan (2008) who documented how framing contests unfolded over 
time, but she did it inside an organization and not at the field level. 
Overall, these studies do not explicitly document at the same time how framing activities are 
elaborated by the opponents and the proponents and how framing contests evolve over time. 
Rather, they examine the development over time of the unilateral relationship of those who 
are framing a situation or they document framing contests in a static way leaving the time 
dimension aside. We believe that combining both the time dimension and collective action 
frames of the proponents and opponents involved in framing contests is essential in order to 
identify the mechanisms which affect the outcome or the resolution of framing contests which 
may manifest itself in the form of institution creation. Furthermore, a comparative analysis 
between the proponents and opponents to a technological standard should lead to new 
theoretical insights (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 2009). 
A characteristic of the concept of framing as defined by the social movement literature is that 
it takes into account the content of collective action frames deployed by activists (Hardy & 
Maguire, 2008). Such content suggests that framing can be decomposed into three core tasks 
(Benford & Snow, 2000). The diagnostic framing task is the process by which problems are 
identified and blame is attributed to specific actors. The prognostic framing task involves 
arguments related to the identification of a solution to the problem. Finally, the motivational 
framing task provides a rationale for engaging in a movement (Benford and Snow, 2000). 
These basic tasks have to be complemented by other factors in order for frames to resonate i.e. 
to be effective. The proffered frames must be credible (consistent, empirically supported and 
8 
8/60 
the claim-makers must be credible) and they have to be relatively salient (central and coherent 
in terms of beliefs, values, ideas, myths, and everyday life of the targets of mobilization) 
(Benford et al, 2000). Regarding salience, scholars have come to realize that actors must draw 
from a repertoire of frames (Clemens, 1993; Kaplan, 2008) or master frames (Benford & 
Snow, 2000; Creed et al., 2002) to elaborate legitimate accounts, otherwise their frame might 
not resonate.  
Besides these characteristics leading to frame resonance, the literature documents four 
framing strategies which can be used to increase the mobilization of participants in a 
movement (Kaplan, 2008; Snow et al., 1986). These strategies are: frame bridging (linking 
two ideologically similar but structurally separate frames), frame amplification (highlighting 
selected beliefs or values), frame extension (through direct contact activists shape their 
message to connect with values of the person to mobilize), and frame transformation (new 
values are promoted, for example something taken-for-granted can be framed as problematic). 
Finally, actors who are the developers and carriers of collective action frames have to be 
perceived as credible (Kaplan, 2008).  
While the concept of framing is central in the social movement literature (McAdam et al., 
1996), the notion of theorization 2  used in the institutional theory is closely related. 
Theorization rapidly evolved to be conceptualized as a discursive strategy to provide 
legitimacy to an innovation (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) and came to include properties such as 
diagnostic and prognostic tasks (Greenwood et al., 2002), making this concept really close to 
framing. In the same manner that frames can become master frames (Benford & Snow, 2000), 
 
 
2 Theorization was initially defined as “the self-conscious development and specification of 
abstract categories and the formulation of patterned relationships such as chains of cause 
and effect” in Strang, D., & Meyer, J. W. 1993. Institutional conditions for Diffusion. 
Theory and Society, 22: 487-511. 
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theorizations can become institutional logics (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008). According to Soule (2004), the only distinction between the concepts of framing and 
theorization is that theorization specifies in addition who should adopt an innovation. We 
draw on both ideas in the paper.  
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY 
Research context and scope of the research 
Due to the context-sensitive nature of our inquiry (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003) and our focus on 
processual data (Yin, 2003), we used a case study approach with embedded units of analysis. 
Specifically, this case documents the activism of environmentalists urging the German 
automotive industry to reduce the emission of particulate matters by introducing the DPF 
technology. The final outcome which we attempt to explain is not regulative, but normative, 
as we investigate how the emerging demand forced the car manufacturers to react swiftly to 
include the DPF technology as a default equipment of Diesel cars in Germany only. Thus, this 
case takes place within Germany from the mid-eighties to mid-2005, when the car 
manufactures largely gave in and announced to equip all their Diesel cars standardly with 
DPFs. 
We selected this case for two reasons. First, experts of both the German environmental 
movement and the automotive industry identified this case as having the potential to reflect 
intensive framing contest activity. As Germany is recognized for having both a powerful 
automotive industry and particularly active environmental NGOs, we expected to observe 
several instances of intense struggle for meaning. The automotive industry constitutes one of 
the most important industrial sectors in Germany, accounting for 866,000 employees and 17 
percent of the entire export volume (Heneric, Licht, & Sofka, 2005). Overall, almost six 
million cars are assembled each year in Germany. The main actors are German original-
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) such as Volkswagen (VW, including Audi), Daimler 
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(Mercedes and Smart) and BMW, but also foreign car manufacturers with a strong domestic 
manufacturing presence such as Ford and General Motors (Opel). The environmental 
movement is also extremely powerful and institutionalized in Germany, having 900 
organizations and about 3.5 million members (Brand, 1999; Carter, 2007). Main actors of the 
social movement organizations in Germany are BUND (German Association for Environment 
and Nature Protection), DUH (German Environmental Help), NABU (The Society for Nature 
Conservation), VCD (Traffic Club Germany) and Greenpeace. 
Second, although it is embedded in a wider context of emission regulations (the next section 
provides some details), the case is well confined to Germany. All our interview partners 
stressed that the heated public debate on Diesel particulate matter and the DPF was an 
endemic German phenomenon. For example, Louis Schweitzer, the former chairman of 
Renault, said that “The discussion about the soot filter for diesel cars is typical German and 
not at all a topic in France“ (Die Welt, April 10, 2005). In fact, as our case analysis will show, 
the debate in Germany was only indirectly linked to the emission regulations. On the contrary, 
due to the pressure from customers, German car manufacturers decided to install DPF systems 
(as standard equipment) significantly before the Euro 5 emission norm made it a necessity in 
2009. 
Technical background 
During the last 20 years, Diesel-powered cars have become very popular in Germany. 
However, compared to spark-ignition engines (running on petrol), Diesel engines emit a 
relatively high amount of particulate matter (PM). Diesel exhaust particulate matter is a 
complex mixture of different substances but its main component is carbonaceous soot. To 
characterize the wide distribution of the particle sizes, it is common to distinguish fine (PM2.5 
with a diameter < 2.5 μm and PM10 with a diameter < 10 μm) and ultrafine (< 100 nm) 
particles. Diesel exhaust particulate matter is a significant anthropogenic source of the overall 
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particulate matter concentration in the atmosphere (outdoor air), particularly in areas of heavy 
traffic such as inner cities. 
As there is accumulated empirical evidence (for a review, see Pope & Dockery, 2006) that 
suggests a link between the concentration of particulate matter in the atmosphere and adverse 
health effects, particulate matter emissions are regulated in many countries. Within the EU, 
the corresponding regulatory environment is formed by two bodies of regulation: (1) Exhaust 
emission standards which set upper limits to the amount of pollutants (such as particulate 
matter) that are allowed to be discharged from a vehicle’s tailpipe into the environment and (2) 
air pollution standards which set upper limits to the concentration of pollutants in the 
atmosphere. Since the introduction of the first exhaust emission standards, several 
amendments have progressively tightened the limits for Diesel particulate matter emissions. 
The standards are commonly referred to as Euro 1 (introduced in 1992, Diesel PM < 140 
mg/km), Euro 2 (in 1996, < 100 mg/km), Euro 3 (in 2000, < 50 mg/km, Euro 4 (in 2005, < 25 
mg/km) and Euro 5 (in 2009, < 5 mg/km). 
In order for their Diesel engines to comply with the increasingly stringent regulations, car 
manufacturers can basically use two approaches: (1) “internal engine” methods and (2) 
exhaust after-treatment methods (Eastwood, 2008). With regard to the former, there are 
several techniques that optimize the combustion so that the engine produces less particulate 
matter. Among other things, a popular direction is to burn the Diesel fuel in a well-controlled 
mix of excess air (“lean burn”) (Dunn-Rankin, Miyasato, & Pham, 2008). With regard to the 
latter, the exhaust gas can be cleansed of particulate matter by using DPF systems which are 
installed between the engine and the tailpipe. While a DPF can reduce particulate matter very 
effectively, it involves a number of technological challenges (thermal robustness, regeneration 
mechanisms and counter-pressure) and trade-offs (DPFs may increase fuel consumption and 
CO2 emissions). For example, Mercedes-Benz introduced the first Diesel car with DPF in 
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1985 in the US, but after three years ceased commercialization due to significant technical 
problems. These challenges, however, have been tackled later and in 2008, Eastwood noted 
that “forthcoming statutory limits are unlikely to be met by any other means [than the DPF]” 
(Eastwood, 2008: 294). 
Data collection 
In order to document how framing contests evolve over time and affect institution creation, 
we collected data from several sources. First, twelve in-depth interviews of 60 to 120 minutes 
were conducted with different specialists and activists in order to gain a good representation 
of the main arguments and events which occurred in the case. Three interviews were 
conducted with key managers and engineers of car manufacturers in Germany, five with 
environmental activists, two with members of the German government, one with a car expert 
and one with an expert on environmental issues. These interviews provided the basis for the 
case study. We started each interview with an open-ended question inviting the interviewee to 
tell the story of the DPF in Germany spontaneously with emphasis on the arguments which 
were elaborated by the different constituents involved in the case study. 
While these interviews allowed us to construct the backbone of the case study, we needed to 
complement this data with written documents to avoid memory bias (Eisenhardt, 1989), to 
identify with greater precision the dates of important events (Langley, 2009) and to 
triangulate our data in order to obtain an accurate case narrative (Yin, 2003). Our launching 
point was a large, meticulously collected set of German newspaper articles (255 articles from 
1997 to 2006) on the DPF debate which we obtained from one of the interviewees. These 
articles already provided a good overview of the positions taken by different actors in the case 
(e.g. automotive OEMs, NGOs, government) and of the important events. To supplement this 
source, we performed a series of text searches using LexisNexis, a major news retrieval 
database that covers a large part of the German newspapers and business press. To reduce the 
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risk of missing important information, we used a broad time frame (January 1985 until 
December 2007) and searched for articles containing the word “Diesel” in combination with 
important keywords identified from the interviews (e.g., “soot”, “particulate matter”, “health”, 
“cancer”, “filter”, “Eolys”, “inner engine”, “no Diesel without Filter”). After the removal of 
duplicates, this search yielded 5112 articles. However, in most of these articles (particularly 
car reviews) the DPF is just a peripheral topic. Therefore, we eliminated car review articles 
and articles in which the keywords just emerged once (the scripting language Perl was used to 
perform this text-mining task). Finally, we restricted the scope to daily, weekly, and monthly 
periodicals with a larger circulation and of different political orientations (e.g., Die Welt, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, Handelsblatt, taz, Die Zeit, Stern, Spiegel). After narrowing the 
relevant time frame (see below), we arrived at a total of 1999 articles (approximately 1.3 
million words and 5000 pages). 
In addition, we augmented our understanding of the case by looking at scientific publications 
which address the DPF technology from a technical perspective (dissertations, conference 
proceedings, scientific journals), but refrained from including these documents in our frame 
analysis, because they do not report collective action frames. 
Data analysis  
To analyse the data, we used an open-ended approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). As we are 
investigating processes by which framing contests evolve over time and lead to institution 
creation, case narratives are indicated to capture the effect of time in our analysis (Langley, 
1999). Consequently, we began by building a case narrative out of our interviews which were 
transcribed by a professional typist. This allowed us to evaluate whether we had a sufficiently 
interesting story to tell (Siggelkow, 2007) and to identify which aspects were more promising 
for a theoretical contribution. 
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We then ordered all available articles chronologically to obtain a reliable timeline of the 
events which constitute the case narrative. We established at this point that the case study 
would unfold from 1985 until June 2005, i.e. from the moment at which public attention 
turned to particulate matter emissions to the moment at which the social movement succeeded 
in creating a demand within Germany for the DPF (which ultimately forced car manufacturers 
to equip all their Diesel cars standardly with DPFs). 
We then compared this timeline with the case narrative obtained from our interviews and 
adjusted it according to the written documents. This decision is based on the assumption that 
written documents are more reliable given that interviewees often have difficulties in recalling 
dates. Thus, this approach avoids chronological biases (Langley, 2009) and allowed for the 
triangulation of our data, thereby further substantiating our case study (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Once we had a case narrative, we used the frame analysis approach (Goffman, 1974) because 
it implies the systematic study of how actors deploy meaning to affect interpretation (Kaplan, 
2008). In order to increase the likelihood of capturing interesting phenomenon, we coded our 
data along several dimensions, as shown in Table 1. To handle the huge amount of articles, 
we stopped coding at 30 articles per month in cases where when we reached a saturation point 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) i.e. when we realized that the same arguments were repeated and further 
reading would not provide new information. In total the analysis covered 577 articles. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Table 1 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
First, we had to identify from our material excerpts (“fragments” in table 1) which would 
constitute collective action frame. By collective action frame we mean the interpretation of an 
issue which is deliberately developed and carried out by proponents, opponents and their 
audience to “fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and 
motivate collective action” (Snow et al., 1986). To perform this task, we first coded our data 
according to the typology of Benford and Snow (2000) to classify our material in terms of the 
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tasks the frames were accomplishing in the case study. This typology has a long tradition (e.g., 
Snow et al., 1986), is well-known (Davis et al., 2005; McAdam et al., 1996) and is 
extensively used in the organization theory literature (e.g., Kaplan, 2008; Weber et al., 2008). 
Fragments from written texts or the interview which identified a problem were coded as 
diagnostic frames. Excerpts which proposed a solution were coded as prognostic frames, and 
citations which invoked any kind of incentives to shape the behaviour of actors were coded as 
motivational frames.  
We then classified these fragments along their polarity i.e. for (pro) or against (con) the DPF. 
The organization or who carried the frame (“who” in the table 1), the source of the fragments 
(i.e. from where the document was taken) and the date of the document from which it was 
taken were added in our coding to easily retrieve the material and to follow the chronology of 
events.  
While coding our material, we realized that there were a myriad fragments and that we needed 
to make sense of this vast material. We followed a technique similar to the one developed by 
Gioia (e.g., Corley & Gioia, 2004) to identify the frames and the main themes alimenting the 
debates about the DPF. Each fragment was categorized along an increasing level of 
abstraction from first order theme, to second order theme and finally to the aggregate level 
(see table 1). The logic used to create cluster of themes having a higher level of abstraction 
was to pool together fragments according to their similarity, i.e. high similarity within a 
category, high dissimilarity between categories. Through this method, we could identify 
collective action frame which corresponds to the second order themes (e.g. “devaluation of 
diesel car without diesel filter”). We then identified six aggregated themes which correspond 
to the pooling of frames having related content. For example, the frame “devaluation of diesel 
car without diesel filter” was classified under the aggregate theme “economic risks and 
benefits” because it talks about the economic risks customers undergo if they buy or not a 
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Diesel car with or without DPF. The aggregate themes identified were: (1) public health 
issues, (2) risks and benefits of the technology, (3) behaviour (in)appropriateness, (4) 
cohesion/fragmentation, (5) regulatory intervention issues and (6) economic risks and benefits.  
All themes emerged from the data and were not imposed from an outside framework (Agar, 
1980). The material was coded iteratively by reading it several times and by adjusting and 
adding new codes as they appeared in the analysis. In practice, we systematically cut every 
single quote which we found in our material and pasted it into an MS Excel spreadsheet. MS 
Excel has the obvious advantage over dedicated coding software (such as NVivo) that it 
contains the pivot table function which instantly builds synthetic tables. 
Because matrix display has the advantage of synthesizing large amounts of data (Langley, 
1999; Miles & Huberman, 1994), our coded material was then organized in two columns 
according to their polarity with the frames (second order theme) in favour of the filter (pro) 
and those against it (con) along a time lime. This method allowed us to identify which 
framing contests was taking place when and around which theme. A selected sample of these 
frames and their polarity are presented in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5. They provide several examples 
of how matrix display was used and how frames were coded. 
Phases emerged from our analysis as we were coding the material. We realized that there was 
a significant change in the themes around which framing contests were taking place or in the 
activities of the social movement. We used these change to delimit our phases. More 
specifically, the necessary opening phase constitutes the first layer of framing contests and 
was mainly constituted of diagnostic and prognostic frames. Our second phase (organizing-
mobilizing phase) was clearly featuring a key event, namely the organization of the social 
movement and the concomitant new layer of framing contests which appears in the data in 
November 2002; as the social movement mobilized more intensively frames having a 
motivational task, namely the cohesion/fragmentation and the behaviour (in)appropriateness 
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themes. The third phase (Instrumentalization of channels) grew out of the two previous layers 
and consisted of the themes economic risks and benefits and regulative intervention issues. 
CASE STUDY: THE DIESEL PARTICULATE FILTER IN GERMANY 
The necessary opening phase (January 1985 – October 2002) 
The First Debates (1985 to 1999). In the nineteen eighties appeared the first scientific 
publications which investigated the health effects of airborne particulate matter (PM). Several 
of these studies suggested that an exposure to ambient PM increases the risk of various 
adverse health outcomes such as asthma, heart failure and throat or lung cancer (Dockery & 
Pope, 1994; Kaiser, 1997; Schwartz, 1991). In 1989, the International Agency for Research 
on Cancer (related to the World Health Organization) rated Diesel engine exhaust gas as 
“probably carcinogenic to humans” (International Agency for Research on Cancer 1989: 42). 
At that time, NGOs in Germany started to turn their attention to Diesel cars and identified 
their PM emissions as a major public health problem. In addition, during the nineteen nineties, 
the propagation of Diesel direct injection technology led to an increase in the emission of 
ultrafine particles which pass through the human lung, enter the bloodstream, and accumulate 
in organs e.g. the brain, leading to increased risk of cerebral infarction: 
“...with the injection technologies of Diesel fuel into the combustion chamber, particulate matters 
became smaller and smaller. We have micro‐particulates of nano size which can enter not only 
the  lungs  and  its  capillaries,  but  also  could  enter  the  bloodstream  and  end  up  in  the  brain.” 
(Environmental activist) 
Against this background and since the PM concentration in many inner city areas regularly 
exceeded the limits set forth in the early air pollution standards, some environmental NGOs 
(e.g., Greenpeace) requested the automotive industry and politicians to develop solutions for 
the Diesel PM issue. The car manufacturers reacted by questioning the negative effects of 
Diesel PM on human health: 
“Latest research from the US‐Health Effects Institutes shows that there are no measurable effects 
of  the  exhaust  of  modern  Diesel  engines  on  health"  (Managing  director  of  the  German 
automotive industry association) 
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Specifically, it was argued that Diesel exhaust’s contribution to the overall PM concentration 
in the atmosphere is small. Since exhaust after-treatment systems were already available for 
Diesel trucks, members of the environmental movement suggested R&D into DPF 
technologies (e.g. Greenpeace, 1993). In response, the car manufacturers stressed the 
technological challenges, costs, and trade-offs associated with DPFs:  
“The industry was saying that Diesel particulate filters are not necessary, it’s not possible, it costs 
too much money.” (Government representative) 
Peugeot’s Diesel Particulate Filter (1999 to 2002). Sensing an opportunity to gain a 
competitive advantage in the German car market, the French automotive OEM PSA Peugeot 
Citroën presented a Diesel car model with a DPF (Peugeot 607 HDi FAP) at the 1999 
Frankfurt Motor Show and launched the model in early 2001 in Germany. Overall, the car 
fulfilled only the current Euro 3 norm, but emitted very little PM due to a filter system (FAP) 
developed by Faurecia, a French supplier in which PSA held a majority stake. At that time, 
this was the only Diesel car available with DPF in Germany. Interestingly, PSA targeted the 
German market exclusively with their DPF system (officially, the DPF was also launched in 
France, but it was hardly available there). The launch was accompanied with a marketing 
campaign including three major TV commercials which compared the “clean” Peugeot with 
the “pollutant” German Diesel cars. The marketing campaign increased public awareness of 
the Diesel soot issue and demonstrated that filters were effective and technologically feasible. 
In response to PSA’s aggressive marketing campaign, the German car manufacturers argued 
that the employed filter technology was ineffective because it required a special chemical 
additive (“Eolys”) which would be more pollutant than the Diesel exhaust itself and because 
the filter needed to be replaced every 80.000 km. Besides, they continued to maintain that 
there was no solid evidence supporting the adverse health effects of Diesel PM: 
“there  is a  lack of scientific evidence for the  interaction of particulates and  its effects on human 
health. I doubt that results from rat tests are informative for human health. Epidemiologic studies 
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are  lacking  and  need  to  be  conducted”  (Corporate  Representative  from  a  major  car 
manufacturer).  
Due to the dispute, environmental NGOs asked the largest German automobile club (ADAC) 
to assess the effectiveness of PSA’s DPF technology. ADAC performed two tests comparing 
the DFP-equipped Peugeot with a similar-sized German car model (Mercedes E220 CDI). In 
both cases, the tests indicated that the DPF reduced PM emissions to almost zero. In reaction 
to these tests, the German car manufacturers argued that, in contrast to the Peugeot model, 
most of their Diesel cars already attained the stricter Euro 4 norm and that the one-sided 
debate on PM would oversimplify the problem: 
“The  filter might solve some problems but  increases new ones, such as  [fuel] consumption  […]” 
(CEO of a major car manufacturer) 
They also pointed out their own R&D efforts on internal engine methods to reduce Diesel PM 
and claimed that this approach was technologically superior to after-treatment solutions. 
In March 2002, in the face of the German car manufacturers’ persistent inaction and denial, 
some NGOs began campaigning more intensively to attract public attention on the PM issue. 
Some members of the environmental movement met with the German car manufacturers to 
state that the NGOs would “go to war” if they would not introduce DPFs. In September 2002, 
the failure of these negotiations brought some NGOs (Greenpeace, DUH) to reiterate the 
adverse health effects of Diesel PM and the advantages of DPFs. However, the position of the 
car manufacturers did not change: 
“The German automotive  industry considers  internal engine solutions to be a smarter approach 
than after‐treatment, because it avoids the production of particles”. And “The utilization of filter 
systems leads – according to the current state of technology – to higher fuel consumption, higher 
costs and requires special maintenance in order to clean the system from residues“ (VDA, German 
Association of the Automotive Industry, November 25, 2002) 
In parallel, the environmental activists and PSA (who in the meantime had also introduced the 
DPF system in several other model series such as the Peugeot 307 and 406) were lobbying the 
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German government to provide tax incentives and to criticize the inappropriateness of current 
European exhaust emission standards, because the air quality standards were often violated. 
Frame Analysis. Following Benford and Snow’s typology (2000), most frames within this 
initial phase can be grouped under two core framing tasks: Diagnostic and prognostic. The 
conflict began with the activism of a few environmental NGOs which – based on the results 
of several scientific studies – diagnosed the Diesel PM as being probably dangerous for 
human health (e.g., carcinogenic, entering the blood stream and brain). This set of diagnostic 
frames which revolved around the identification of a public health problem was counter-
framed by the car manufacturers as not being an issue because there was no sufficient 
scientific evidence that PM emitted from Diesel engines have an impact on human health. 
Since DPFs existed for trucks (although based on a different technology), the environmental 
NGOs elaborated a prognostic frame (a solution) which was counter-framed by the car 
manufacturers by arguing that DPFs for cars face too many technical challenges, are too 
costly and overall not necessary to attain the forthcoming (in 2005) Euro 4 norm. Their 
technology pipeline focused on internal engine methods to comply with Euro 4. Thus, in the 
beginning of this phase, we find mainly public health issues and technological risks and 
benefits as the dominant frame themes. 
The prognostic framing activity gained significant momentum with the market launch of 
Peugeot’s DPF-equipped car. Suddenly, the technological infeasibility arguments of the 
German car manufacturers were refuted and the solution suggested by the environmental 
activists evolved from a potential to a viable solution. The German car manufacturers counter-
framed this new development by discrediting PSA’s DPF technology (e.g., generally 
ineffective, not reliable, more polluting due to the chemical additive). The framing gained 
further in intensity with the large and well-respected automobile club ADAC running rigorous 
tests and “proving” the effectiveness of Peugeot’s DPF technology. We refer to this 
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progressive evolution of the prognostic frames’ intensity (i.e., from a potential technology to a 
viable solution based on substantial evidence) as frame polarization. 
Finally, a new type of framing task appeared in October 2001 with the German car 
manufacturers arguing that DPFs increase fuel consumption, a (de)motivational frame 
(Benford & Snow, 2000) which aims at impeding any form of mobilization with the 
environmental NGOs. The theme of this frame is related to economic risks and benefits 
because it addresses the costs that customer would incur if they bought a car with DPF. Table 
2 summarizes the main frames and counter-frames which were mobilized over time by 
proponents and opponents of the DPF during this phase. At the end of this phase, the 
environmental activists perceive that they have legitimate diagnostic (Diesel PM as a 
significant public health problem) and prognostic frames (the DPF as a viable solution) which 
are stonewalled by the car manufacturers. This sets the stage for the subsequent framing 
contest. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Table 2 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 
The organizing and mobilizing phase (November 2002 – February 2004) 
Formation of a Coalition. In November 2002, a coalition named “No Diesel without filter” 
(originally: “Kein Diesel ohne Filter”) was officially created under the leadership of DUH 
(German Environmental Help) and joined by the major German environmental NGOs (BUND, 
DNR, Greenpeace, NABU, VCD). The initial coalition grew rapidly and finally also included 
the WHO (World Health Organization), the German Child Protection Association, ADAC, as 
well as 97 smaller NGOs. Creating a coalition was considered to be one of the few measures 
which might make the German car industry move. In this vein, a government representative 
stated that “only a coalition has the strength to go against the power of the car industry.” The 
aim of this coalition was to “promote the rapid and widespread installation of particulate 
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filters in order to fight against diseases induced by Diesel soot” (internal document). While 
health problems were invoked to justify the use of a DPF, the fact that the French competitor 
PSA could introduce the technology was also an argument brought forward by the pro-DPF 
coalition: “if the French manufacturers did it, the German manufacturers can also do it.” 
In December 2002, in order to support their claim that Diesel PM is dangerous for human 
health, the coalition started their campaign with a press conference where they conducted an 
experiment with two German Diesel cars– one equipped with a DPF (provided by Faurecia), 
the other without. The following quote describes the experiment which was run by a three-
year old child: 
“So we could show that if you monitor the emissions of a normal Diesel car with a normal paper 
tissue, it is still white after half of a minute. This gives the impression that the car is clean. Then, 
the child used a white special particulate  filter  tissue.  It became black  in  seconds.  It was  really 
impressive. With this experiment, we could show that even a paper tissue cannot block extremely 
small  particulates  and  that  we  need  a  special  tissue  with  extremely  small  structure  to  block 
them.” (Environmental Activitist) 
Fragmenting the Automotive Industry. After this public demonstration, the pro-DPF coalition 
approached various German car manufacturers to offer their support in exchange for the 
introduction of the DPF in their fleets by mid-2003. Ford Germany was the only one inclined 
to talk to the coalition and even negotiated with PSA/Faurecia the supply of DPF modules. In 
order to reward and motivate Ford Germany, the coalition gave a red card (in analogy to being 
sent off the field in soccer) to each German car manufacturer except for Ford Germany which 
received a yellow card (in analogy to receiving a warning in soccer). Just after it received a 
yellow card, one of the top managers of Ford Germany called a member of the coalition and 
asked to receive a red card as well because all the CEOs of the German car manufacturers 
were angry that Ford Germany had accepted in order to obtain a competitive advantage with 
the filter and threatened Ford Germany with isolation from the German Car Manufacturers 
Association. One member of the coalition recalls: 
“Within  two  hours,  I  got  a  phone  call  from  the  office  of  the  director  of  Ford  Germany.  The 
assistant of the CEO told me: ‘Mr Y, you can’t imagine what is happening. Every five minutes we 
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get  phone  calls  by  the  other  CEOs  of German  car manufacturers.  They  are  telling  us  that  the 
alliance at German Association of the Automotive Industry [VDA] in Frankfurt is broken for [Ford 
Germany]. We have to ask you to give us a red card like the others [car manufacturers] because 
we  have  to  cancel  our  order  to  PSA  for  particulate  filters.  I  know  it’s  absurd  to  ask  PSA  to 
reconstruct  that  engine without particulate  filter, although  this engine was only available  in a 
series production with particulate  filter, but  [Ford Germany] doesn’t want to be  leader with the 
filter, we want  for  the years  to come  to make motors without particulate  filters. Otherwise  the 
alliance with all the others [car manufacturers] is endangered.” (Environmental Activist) 
While there was strong pressure inside the automotive industry to stay united with and loyal 
to the majority of car manufacturers (assembled in the VDA i.e. the German Association of 
the Automotive Industry), in July 2003 the Federal Environment Agency (UBA), Germany’s 
central federal authority on environmental matters, published an epidemiologic study which 
estimated that 14,000 people were dying each year in Germany due to the emission of traffic-
related PM. In August 2003, another German car manufacturer announced that it could readily 
install DPFs on some of its car models, but it hesitated to be the first mover. 
At the same time, the environmental movement made attempts to mobilize DPF suppliers 
(competitors to Faurecia), who had considerable interest in the success of the campaign in 
order to expand their market (Handelsblatt, August 6, 2003). Later, it turned out that certain 
DFP suppliers even supported the pro-DPF coalition with funds. In response, German car 
manufacturers threatened to terminate or curtail their supply contracts with these suppliers if 
they kept on collaborating with the environmentalists. In parallel, various seminars were held 
by lung specialists with the aim of informing the public about the consequences of Diesel PM. 
In September 2003, on the occasion of the International Automobile Show (IAA) in Frankfurt, 
the German car manufacturers jointly announced that they would offer DPFs for all cars at the 
earliest (effectively until mid-2004). The position of the car manufacturers was: “we will do 
what the market asks.” However, as they still focused on complying with the Euro 4 norm 
(and not on reducing PM per se), the DPF would only become standard equipment for cars 
with larger Diesel engines (> 2.5 litres). For smaller engines, the car manufacturers intended 
to offer DFPs only as an optional extra (at an extra charge of 500 to 1,000 Euros), because the 
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norms were easily attainable without DPF. Therefore, the settlement – reached between the 
German Government and the VDA – was considered as insufficient by the pro-DPF coalition.  
Frame Analysis. This second phase starts with the constitution of a coalition formed with the 
joint goal to promote the DPF as a technological de facto standard. This organization allowed 
the proponents to increase the credibility of their frames (because the coalition covered a 
broad range of different members of society, e.g., environmental NGOs, ADAC, WHO) and 
to obtain access to additional resources. 
Given their new power, the coalition attempted to “proselytize” members of the automotive 
industry. This lead to the creation of new cohesion/fragmentation frames which were not 
present in the previous phase. Indeed, the car manufactures faced challenges to maintaining 
their cohesion as Ford Germany and the DPF suppliers were ready to cooperate with the 
environmental movement. Obviously, automotive suppliers who had discretion over DPF 
technology had incentives to break apart and support the DPF campaign more or less overtly. 
Likewise, Ford Germany searched for ways of getting the DPF technology into its car models. 
In the first instance, the industry could frame arguments to restore cohesion by threatening to 
terminate/curtail their relationship with some suppliers and Ford Germany.  
The car manufacturers did not directly counter-frame the result of the experiment conducted 
by the three-year old child which showed that filters are effective. Instead, the car 
manufacturers responded by stressing that it was inappropriate and abusive behaviour of the 
DPF proponents. Thus, facing the prognostic frame “effectiveness of the filter,“ the car 
manufacturers opted to respond with a motivational frame, i.e. the experiment was abusive 
because it involved a little child. Likewise, they accused the environmental movement of 
behaviour inappropriateness when the movement brought the frame that Diesel PM kills 
14,000 people per year. They dismissed this frame as “panic mongering.” This suggests an 
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asymmetric framing contest where the reply does not directly address the content of the frame, 
but rather attacks the integrity of the people involved. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Table 3 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
There is also a cumulative effect of previous frames. Indeed, the technological risks and 
benefits and the public health issues were present in previous episodes and were still valid and 
activated in the interplay of actors in 2002. We observed also a polarization i.e. an 
intensification of the public health issues. Indeed, frames describing the effect of Diesel PM 
in terms of causing health problems in March 2002 were invoking the number of deaths in 
November 2002. Table 3 summarizes the main frames and counter-frames which were 
mobilized during this episode. 
Finally, the car manufactures gave a little bit in by agreeing to offer DPFs for all cars. 
However, since they still did not offer the DPF as standard equipment at no extra charge, the 
debate remained unsolved. 
The instrumentalization of channels phase (March 2004 – June 2005) 
At the federal level, the pro-DPF coalition and the car manufacturers were both struggling to 
persuade the federal government to support them. The industry organized lobbying activities 
to reach the Green party and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) both of which were in power 
at that time. The coalition was also active in terms of lobbying and involved in hearings at the 
German parliament where NGOs, WHO, physicians and children’s associations were 
presenting public health arguments (by invoking the number of deaths related to Diesel PM) 
and were militating in favour of the DPF. In March 2004, only three hours after the Green 
party and the SPD considered that tax incentives to promote DPFs could be an option, the 
CEO of Volkswagen wrote a private letter to the government which said: “if you force the 
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[car] manufacturers to use this technology [DPF], you will kill the German Diesel industry” 
(Automobilwoche, April 25, 2005). 
At this point, the environmental movement had gained sufficient legitimacy to be able to use 
economic arguments and be perceived as credible. Indeed, they largely disseminated the result 
of a forecast study (conducted by EurotaxSchwacke, but commissioned by the Federal 
Environmental Agency) which concluded that Diesel cars which were not equipped with 
DPFs would be devalued by 500 to 2,000 Euros depending on the brand and the type of car. 
This evaluation had an enormous impact on customer behaviour as leasing companies began 
having difficulty selling cars without DPF and customers were asking for the DPF: 
“We  commissioned a  study and  it  concluded  that  the  value of a  car without a  filter would be 
about 500 to 2,000 Euros lower [than a car with a filter] after five years. Our conclusion alarmed 
leasing companies because they rely on the value of used cars to resell their cars. [...] So, leasing 
companies made a calculation on the value of cars after the  leasing period. If the value  is going 
down, of course, they have a big loss of money. If you buy 100,000 vehicles and each vehicle loses 
2,000 Euros above average,  you  lose a  lot of money.  The  study was  conducted by a  company 
which evaluates the value of used cars.  It was expected that they would publish reports stating 
that the value of a used car without a filter would be about 500 or 2,000 Euros lower depending 
on the type of the car. It was the end of the debate.” (Government representative)  
As the pressures from the coalition and the public increased and were reflected weekly in the 
lay press, politicians were closely interested in how this issue was developing. Initially, the 
government thought that introducing a tax incentive could be a viable option, but the trend of 
the market was suggesting that there was no longer any need for this: 
“The  idea was to give a tax  incentive to customers, but  in the end there was no need because  if 
the  market  for  Diesel  cars  without  filter  vanished  it  would  have  been  useless  [to  provide 
incentives].” (Government representative) 
Car manufacturers who did not have contracts with DPF suppliers saw their share in the 
Diesel car market dropping and had to invest heavily in increasing supplier capacity 
(particularly in Japan). Indeed, the problem was that even though the car manufacturers 
wanted to offer DPFs, there was not enough supply to equip the large annual volume of 
German Diesel cars. The Head of the engineering department of one of the major car 
manufacturers commented: 
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“And then something happened that we didn’t expect. Because  it had been pushed  in the public 
that those cars [without filter were undesirable], by then called the ‘smokers’ in contrast to ‘non‐
smokers,’  the  customers  took  a  ‘bad’  attitude  [by  asking  for  filters].  This  was  completely 
astonishing for us because we realized for the first time that this debate on particulate emissions 
was more an emotional thing than a rational one. And this emotional effect surprised us a  little 
bit that is why we were late to react.” 
Frame Analysis. While we still observe the process of framing and counter-framing based on 
established themes such as public health issues and technological risks and benefits, this last 
phase is characterized by a major change, namely the involvement of both the government 
and the customers. Two important frames of the pro-DPF coalition were critical in activating 
these groups as channels to exchange frames. 
First, based on the obtained media attention, the coalition disseminated the frame “many 
people die in Germany because of Diesel soot particulates” which was derived from a credible 
study commissioned by the Federal Environmental Agency. This frame attracted government 
attention and triggered a discussion of how to motivate customers to buy cars with DPF 
(ranging from banning Diesel cars from inner cities to tax incentives). The car manufacturers 
tried effectively to counter-frame this by reminding the government that such legislation 
would seriously hurt the German car industry, threaten many jobs, and after all be inconsistent 
with European law. While the regulatory intervention frame was already voiced earlier by the 
DPF proponents, what is specific at this phase is that this frame was powerfully counter-
framed by threatening the government that tax incentives could “kill” the Diesel car 
technology in Germany. 
Once the discussion on DPF incentives for new cars was established in the media coverage, 
the proponents were able to craft the second important frame, “economic value of the car”, 
which called the resale option of Diesel cars without DPF seriously into question. Although it 
was not yet clear which direction the legislation would take, this motivational frame 
(supported by the study of a market research firm who is a very credible specialist for the 
calculation of residual values) made the customers suddenly pay attention to the DPF issues 
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and the arguments from the proponents. Moreover, the frame “economic value of the car” was 
increasingly polarized. The framing started from “cars without filter will lose value” and 
ended in the notion that reselling cars without DPF would become almost impossible in the 
near future.3 This resonated with the customers, because the frame conveyed individualized 
negative consequences. The strong frame “economic value of the car” dominated the media 
and made the customers “pull” the DPF technology from the car makers. The summary of this 
phase is shown in Table 4. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Table 4 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 
ANALYSIS 
Polarizing framing contests 
Often treated as static in the literature, our results show that frames develop over time since 
proponents and opponents of the DPF adjust their arguments according to the evolution of the 
war over the DPF. Accordingly, our case suggests that, as attempts to convince manufacturers 
of the automotive industry, suppliers, consumers and the government failed, the social 
movement elaborated stronger arguments in order to achieve their goal i.e. making the DPF a 
standard for Diesel cars. Manufacturers reacted to these attacks by crafting counter-frames 
which also became more extreme. This dynamic led to a phenomenon which we call frame 
polarization because the arguments of both the proponents and the opponents of the DPF 
 
 
3 It has to be noted that several suppliers offered affordable DPF retrofitting kits. However, 
according to experts, these kits are so-called “(half)open systems” which attain only 30 to 
40% of the effectiveness of original equipment DPFs. For this reason, retrofitting was not an 
option to circumvent the economic loss. 
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became increasingly extreme and evocative over time. Since the polarization occurs for both 
parties, we can state that not only frames but also the framing contests are polarizing. 
The polarization phenomenon is substantiated in different manners in the case study and on 
several collective action frames. For example, the collective action frames which are related 
to public health issues performed a diagnostic framing task because they identified a problem 
that had to be solved. Independent activists, and later on the social movement for the DPF, 
first argued that particulate matter emissions were carcinogenic, then added another line of 
argument by stating that Diesel soot particulates increase the number of deaths and constitute 
a risk for children, and finally provided an estimate of yearly deaths related to these emissions. 
This polarization phenomenon was nurtured by the reaction of the opponents of the filter 
(members of the automotive industry) who continued to deny that soot particulate emission 
was a public health issue. They first argued that there was a lack of evidence and then they 
denied the validity of the evidence by questioning the generalizability of the studies on rats to 
human beings. Later on, confronted with the argument about the estimated number of deaths, 
opponents of the filter changed their approach by beginning to question the appropriateness of 
the behaviour of the environmental movement, accusing them of panic-mongering. Table 5 
displays the polarization of the frames of the four main themes on which actors engaged in 
framing contests, namely public health issues, risks and benefits of the technology, economic 
risk and benefits and regulatory intervention issues. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Table 5 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Frame polarization was also observed in our data in the framing contests related to risks and 
benefits of the technology which accomplished a prognostic framing task (identifying a 
solution) in our case. Before 1999, the proponents of the filter initially argued that the filter 
technology offered a potential solution. With the commercialization by Peugeot of cars with 
the DPF in Germany, this technology was no longer framed as a potential solution but became 
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a viable commercial one. After the test of the automobile club (ADAC), the filter was framed 
as an effective evidence-based solution. This line of arguments corresponds to a frame 
polarization because framing passed from a potential solution to a commercial one (which, 
however, is not a proof of its effectiveness) and an evidence-based solution. In this framing 
activity, each argument increases the legitimacy of the technology. This framing of the filter 
was counter-framed by the automotive industry members as an ineffective technology and 
with the commercialization of the Peugeot’s filter as a technology which is actually even 
more polluting (note the paradox here). 
In 2001, new frames related to the theme of economic risk and benefits accomplished a 
motivational framing task because they provided rationale for customers to engage in the 
social movement through their purchasing power. These frames were attempting to influence 
the perception of customers over the costs or savings a DPF would incur. At first, opponents 
of the filter argued that this technology increases fuel consumption which translates to 
customers as increasing the cost of driving. This argument was counter-framed by the 
environment coalition which claimed that there was no effect on fuel consumption. Later on, 
the environmental coalition counter-attacked by arguing that cars without a filter would see 
their value drop by 500 to 2000 Euros. This economic frame was counter-framed by the 
automotive industry by denying such a claim. Again, in this case, this framing contest 
polarized because the financial implication of having or not having a filter increased over time 
from a few Euros when fuelling to hundreds of Euros when reselling used cars. 
The framing activities related to regulatory intervention issues were also meant to accomplish 
a motivational framing task because these aimed at changing customers’ behaviour through 
tax incentives. Whereas the environmental coalition was asking for tax incentives, the 
automotive industry members polarized their frame when politicians began talking seriously 
about introducing a tax incentive. The CEO of one of the major car manufacturers sent a letter 
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to the government explaining that tax incentives could “kill” the Diesel car industry in 
Germany and might “kill” its technological edge which focused on internal engine measures. 
Clearly, this position manifests a polarization of the position of the industry by using threat. 
From this analysis, our results suggest that frame polarization is not an isolated phenomenon 
since it is reflected in the three core framing tasks, namely the diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational framing tasks (Benford & Snow, 2000) and it occurs on both sides of the conflict. 
Given that the frames of both proponents and opponents of the DPF became more polarized 
and consequently that the framing contests themselves also became more extreme, our results 
suggest that frames and framing contests are not static but develop over time. In our case, 
frame development took the form of frame polarization which seems to have occurred 
because previous struggles did not lead to the expected outcome i.e. making the DPF a by-
default technology in Diesel cars. 
Cumulating phases 
Our data suggest that in order to creation a new standard, i.e. the DPF, a cumulative 
mechanism is at play. Different phases characterized by different framing contests cumulate 
over time and form the necessary conditions for the resolution of a conflict. This phenomenon 
is similar to a sedimentation process where the older phases or layers of framing contests are 
still active when new phases begin. In order for framing contests to endure over time, some 
activities have to take place first on which other framing activities from the opponents and 
proponents of the DPF sediment. As such, initial debates or framing contests are a 
prerequisite for further framing activities to take place. By organizing these framing contests 
in phases (see the methodology section for further details on how we defined these phases), 
we observe that the necessary opening phase constitutes the foundation of the conflict and is a 
necessary condition for the organizing-mobilizing phase or the instrumentalization of 
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channels phase to occur. Table 6 provides an overview of the cumulative effect of social 
movement activities in which framing contests play a crucial role occurring over time. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Table 6 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Necessary Opening Phase. The first phase is characterized by framing contests over two 
dominant themes which constitute the necessary conditions for further framing contests to 
take place. The first framing contests within this phase consisted essentially of fighting over 
the existence or non-existence of public health issues (diagnostic framing and counter-framing 
tasks) and on the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of the DPF in lowering the particulate matter 
emissions (prognostic framing and counter-framing tasks). If no problem or no solution had 
been identified; there would have been no need for the social movement to engage in 
institutional war with the automotive industry to promote a new industrial standard i.e. the 
DPF. In other words, for an institutional war to occur, it is necessary that a problem has been 
identified and a corresponding solution is available.  
Organizing and Mobilizing Phase. Although framing a problem and a solution are the 
necessary conditions for an institutional change to take place, our case suggests that these 
necessary conditions are not sufficient, otherwise the DPF would have become standard in 
Diesel cars when Peugeot commercialized its filter and when carcinogenic evidence was 
available. Frames need credible carriers to gain legitimacy. The coalition was formed out of 
very influential NGOs from different sectors such as medicine (WHO), child-care 
associations and other environmental organizations (such as Greenpeace). The formation of 
this coalition came about because the diagnostic and prognostic collective action frames of 
this necessary opening phase constituted the basic ingredients for 97 social movement 
organizations to work together. Without such a powerful coalition, it is unlikely that further 
frames developed or carried from the coalition would resonate and generate institutional 
change. During the same phase, the social movement attempted to fragment the German 
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automotive industry by mobilizing car manufacturers and suppliers. For example, when the 
environmental movement approached the manufacturers of DPF (the first-tier suppliers of the 
car manufacturers) to collaborate with them, these suppliers provided the movement with a 
substantial amount of financial resource to lead their war. However, the car manufacturers 
wielded their power and threatened these dependent suppliers with the termination of their 
contracts if they continued to work with the movement. In this example, it is clear that the 
environmental movement found allies within the automotive industry, although the suppliers 
were forced to withdraw from any activity with the movement. Another example comes from 
the action of the environmental movement to encourage Ford Germany to use PSA Peugeot’s 
filter in their cars in exchange for their support. The support was then to attract a lot of media 
attention by giving red cards to all car manufacturers except for Ford Germany which 
received a yellow card. However, as the case shows, strong internal forces were at play to 
bring Ford Germany “back on track” and it had to renounce. Behaviour inappropriateness was 
also pinpointed by both factions to discredit opponents as a way to increase cohesion within 
the automotive industry.  
These attempts by the social movement and the automotive industry to discredit or fragment 
the opponents constitute a form of cohesion testing as strong internal counter-forces were 
mobilized, especially on the part of the automotive industry, to ensure the cohesion of such 
central players of the industry as major suppliers and Ford Germany.  
Activities of this phase served to feed the next phase as the coalition built a solid credibility 
and there were some indications that some central actors within the automotive industry were 
ready to provide their support. From then on, this institutional war was taken to another level 
by attempts to mobilize alternative channels i.e. the customers and the government.  
The Instrumentalization of Channels Phase. Whereas in the preceding phases the social 
movement engaged directly with the automotive industry, the mobilizing outsiders phase is 
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characterized by a change in the offensive strategy of the environmental coalition. In order to 
achieve their goal of bringing about new industrial standards (i.e. the generalized use of DPF 
in Diesel cars), the environmental movement began attempting to mobilize alternative 
channels (customers and the government) to join the social movement. While government 
intervention could have led to the introduction of tax incentives to promote the use of the DPF, 
influencing customer norms by framing the negative individualized economic consequences 
of not having a DPF dramatically affected the demand for the DPF technology. These 
channels have the capacity to affect the automotive industry through customer purchasing 
power or regulation. This shows that in order to induce change in society, direct confrontation 
through framing might not be the most efficient tactic.  
Although the sequence of these phases was observed from our empirical material, they follow 
a logic. Indeed, engaging in a framing contest presupposes the necessary conditions of having 
a problem and a solution (necessary opening phase). However, our case suggests that having 
elaborated a problem and a solution is not sufficient to mobilize people to engage in a social 
movement. Credible carriers and developers of frames have to organize in order to create a 
critical mass of activists which are supporting this institutional project. Once this coalition 
was built, the social movement attempted to fragment the automotive industry by mobilizing 
central players, but strong counter-forces came into play to prevent this industry from 
fragmenting. If there would have not been such cohesive forces within the German car 
industry, the DPF could have been a source of competitive advantage for Ford Germany and 
could have forced other players to join the movement. However, it indicated that some 
constituents of the industry were ready to join the movement but other actions had to take 
place and other constituents had to be reached through motivational frames.  
The first two phases constitute the foundation for further framing contests to take place and to 
generate a new de facto standard. Indeed the first two phases provide the basic ingredients for 
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a war on an issue by providing the diagnostic and the prognostic frame and by generating 
strong frame carriers to mobilize organizations from different sectors including the attempt to 
mobilize central organizations from the automotive industry such as the main suppliers and 
one important car manufacturer. Thus, the phase instrumentalization of channels accumulates 
onto the two precedent phases and sets the scene for new motivational frames to resonate in 
alternative channels. At this point, the DPF was not perceived as necessary. It is when the 
social movement elaborated a collective action motivational frame having negative 
individualized economic consequences that a new norm emerged.  
The economic benefit of the filter to consumers took time to establish, having first to show 
the legitimacy of the technology through various tests (ADAC, the experiment with the little 
girl, the scientific community, etc.). During this period, there were signs that some central 
players were ready to adapt and that expensive cars would have a filter. It was only under 
these conditions that the instrumentalization of channels phase could bear fruit, making the 
DPF a necessary item of equipment. 
These phases are cumulative because the motivational frames “devaluation of the Diesel cars 
without DPF” would not have had the power to generate a new standard without the 
prognostic and diagnostic frames, and without the powerful coalition carrying it. While the 
sequence of phases appeared in this order in our data, it is important to note that these 
activities might also appear in different sequences in other settings.  
Motivational framing tasks having negative consequences 
By looking at both sides of the interaction, we found that it is not only motivational frames 
which provide rationales to engage in social movement: opponents also develop their own 
frames to impede people from engaging in social movement. For example, the automotive 
industry was framing the DPF as increasing Diesel consumption or was arguing that not 
having a DPF would not affect the value of the car. Therefore, it is more accurate to state that 
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there are motivational and demotivational frames which counter-balance each other’s effect. 
This suggests that in order to understand how resonance works, studies should focus on both 
sides of the interaction i.e. the collective action frames developed by the proponents and 
opponents of a cause. 
Why did the collective action frames of the necessary opening and the organizing-mobilizing 
phases not succeed in mobilizing actors to engage in the movement? What is surprising is that 
even extremely polarized diagnostic frames such as the number of deaths yearly caused by 
particulate matter emissions were not sufficient to mobilize customers or to make the industry 
more receptive to the DPF. One reason which can be invoked is that this collective action 
frame does not provide individualized consequences to customers or the industry to produce 
or ask for DPF technology, thereby not accomplishing a motivational task. In other words, 
this frame is statistical and does not point to who is going to die. Another reason is that these 
frames were counter-framed by the industry accusing the environmental movement of panic-
mongering. This could annihilate the effect of the frame of the social movement. For example, 
in the second phase, the automotive industry provided a demotivational frame to consumers 
by stating that the DPF could increase Diesel consumption which was accompanied by a 
denial from the social movement. This demotivational frame stated the negative consequences 
related to having a DPF in a Diesel car.  
At this point, the environmental movement did not provide a strong motivational frame to 
mobilize actors outside the movement-industry relationship. Interestingly, it is only the frame 
“devaluation of the car” which resonated with the customers. We argue that this frame was 
effective because it provided negative individualized evidence-based consequences of not 
having the DPF (motivational task) which started to be perceived as a problem by customers 
and it was not substantially counter-framed by the automotive industry.  
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Three reasons can be invoked to support our claim. First, the frame “devaluation of the cars” 
provided individualized consequences of not having a DPF, thereby accomplishing a 
motivational task. As previously stated, the diagnostic frame on public health issues, such the 
number of deaths, does not address the individual directly but as anonymous consequences 
given that nobody knows who is going to be a victim or who the losers are. In the case of the 
frame “devaluation of the car”, we know exactly who would lose i.e. buyers of Diesel cars 
which represent around 50% of the cars sold in Germany.  
Second, the polarity of the consequences matter. In this case, the “frame devaluation of the 
cars” had important negative consequences because people could lose up to 2000 Euros on the 
reselling price. Those who were the most affected by this were the leasing companies. 
Because not having a DPF had negative consequences, it began to be perceived as the 
problem to be addressed by Diesel car buyers.  
Finally, the frame “devaluation of the car” was evidence-based and quantified. Stating that 
people would lose between 500 to 2000 EUROS if they bought a car without filter was a 
powerful means to substantiate the claim. In contrast, this frame was only weakly counter-
framed by the automotive industry. They counter-argued merely by denying the arguments of 
the environmental movement, defending the position that not having a filter did not affect the 
value of the Diesel cars.  
Interestingly, the frame developed by the automotive industry during the second phase and 
related to increased Diesel consumption, played a similar role but in favour of the automotive 
industry as they developed frames having negative individualized consequences and were also 
weakly counter-framed by the environmental movement through denial.  
Overall, the turning point in the case study came when the social movement developed the 
frame based on the theme economic risks and benefits which develop frames around the idea 
that cars without DPFs would be devalued in the future (a negative individualized evidence-
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based consequence). This brought a change in customer norms, notably of leasing companies, 
as they began asking for DPFs when buying Diesel cars in order to avoid losing money. To 
avoid losing their market share, car manufacturers had to adjust quickly and those who did not 
have contracts with filter suppliers lost out. Due to the demand for DPF, car manufacturers 
began offering this equipment as standard on Diesel cars.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
While framing contests and their impact on the emergence of institutions has received 
attention, studies that examine how proponents and opponents involved in framing contests 
shape collective action frames over time is scarce. To address this issue, we drew on an in-
depth case study of the environmental movement for the DPF in Germany. 
Our study highlights the fact that different phases of framing contests cumulate over time. The 
necessary opening phase constitutes the first layer for a conflict to take place over an issue as 
it is characterized by contests over diagnostic (identification of a problem) and prognostic 
(identification of a solution) frames. We argue that this first phase is the necessary first layer 
because without an initial problem and a solution, there would be no reason to engage in a 
conflict. We found that the subsequent organizing and mobilizing phase sedimented onto the 
previous one and was characterized by the organization of the social movement through the 
creation of a broad coalition and by its attempts to mobilize central actors of the automotive 
industry in order to fragment it. The instrumentalization of channels phase was the last one to 
sediment on the two precedent layers. This phase features the emergence of frames related to 
the devaluation of Diesel cars without filter and the mobilization of alternative channels such 
as the customers. We argue that this frame resonated because it involved negative 
individualized evidence-based consequences. This frame is powerful because it applies to 
everyone who intends to buy a Diesel car, because it has important negative consequences 
which are financial in that case and the social movement provided evidence to support their 
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claim. In contrast, the claims of the opponents of the DPF simply denied the collective action 
frame of the social movement without proposing other consequences and without supporting 
evidence. Their framing activity did not convince the customers who began exercising their 
purchasing power by asking for the DPF, thereby forcing the German automotive industry to 
make the DPF a de facto standard – although unnecessary from a regulatory perspective (most 
of their cars complied with the effective Euro 4 norm even without DFP). We believe that it is 
capital for motivational frames depicting negative individualized evidence-based 
consequences to sediment on solid ground composed of diagnostic and prognostic frames 
carried by a strong social movement. Furthermore, we found that framing contests evolve 
over time through an increased polarization of arguments, in our case, by the proponents and 
opponents of the DPF, thereby reflecting an increasing intensity of the conflict.  
Frame polarization 
While most previous studies document how social movements shape their own collective 
action frames without exploring the counter-framing activities of their opponents (e.g. 
Clemens, 1993; Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Markowitz, 2007; Rao et al., 2003; 
Schneiberg & Soule, 2005; Sine & Lee, 2009; Weber et al., 2008) – or when they are doing so, 
failing to document how framing contests evolve over time (e.g. Creed et al., 2002; Suddaby 
& Greenwood, 2005) – our study extends previous work in the social movement literature 
which used framing contests to document the emergence of institution by looking at both 
sides of the interaction (proponents versus opponents). Our study also extends the literature 
on institutional entrepreneurship which has mainly developed actor-centric narratives in 
which the action of institutional entrepreneurs is extensively documented to the exclusion of 
other actors (Wijen and Ansari, 2007), notably those who resist change (Hardy & Maguire, 
2008). While these studies offer an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the 
emergence of institution, they fail to examine explicitly how framing contests involving 
40 
40/60 
actors with extremely divergent interests evolve over time and how these struggles are 
associated with the emergence of institution (Benford & Snow, 2000; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; 
Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006). 
Our analysis shows that frames and framing contests develop over time. In our case, frames 
and framing contests developed towards polarization. Polarization reflects an increasing 
intensity of the conflict and reflects the creativity of actors in finding ways to mobilize more 
adherents to their cause by framing more extreme arguments on both sides of the fence.  
Frame polarization refers to the increasingly extreme and evocative content of frames of both 
the proponents and the opponents involved in framing contests. The polarization of the 
framing activities in our case is a generalized phenomenon which involves all the core 
framing tasks, i.e. diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational (Benford & Snow, 2000). The 
concept of frame polarization describes how frames and framing contests unfold over time. It 
is thus different from previous concepts developed in the social movement literature, such as 
frame amplification (Snow et al., 1986) which refers to a strategy used by social movements 
to amplify values and ideologies present in a targeted field in order to mobilize new activists. 
To some extent, frame polarization is congruent with the observation of Tarrow (1989, 1998) 
who remarked that social movements are characterized by cycles of protest which tend to 
increase in intensity across the social system. However, instead of documenting the spread of 
the movement over a given population, our focus was on the intensity of their framing activity 
in framing contests. 
Cumulative mechanism 
Our work also extends the literature by documenting a cumulative process of phases of social 
movement activities where framing contests plays a critical role. We argue that the initial 
phase which we call necessary opening is the first layer upon which the organizing and 
mobilizing phase sediments and on which the environmental coalition is formed, and which in 
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turn constitutes the ground on which the powerful motivational frame “devaluation of the cars” 
could mobilize alternative channels. While the idea of sequence or phases (Schneiberg & 
Lounsbury, 2008) is not new in the social movement and the institutional theory literature, our 
contribution lies in our focus specifically on the evolution of framing contests by looking at 
both sides of the interaction. 
The current literature suggests that the rise of new institutions never occurs from a clean slate. 
Rather, new institutions normally build upon fragmentary cultural materials which are at the 
disposal of social movement. Tarrow (1989, 1998) mentions that social movements engage in 
cycles of protest where the mobilization of certain tactics seem to follow a certain sequence. 
For example, a social movement transforms its tactics from protest to lobbying as the 
movement matures. Hoffman (1999) also suggests that the institutionalization of 
environmentalism follows specific sequences starting with its institutionalization through 
regulations which were then transformed into social norms and became afterward taken for 
granted in the chemical industry. Examining the evolution of frame alignment strategy of 
reforms in the public universities of the USA, Marichal (2009)found that frames evolve 
through different phases: accommodation (activists demonstrating the need to adopt reform), 
consolidation (building a core constituency of supporters) and bridging (converting those who 
are “on the fence” into activists). While these phases are close to ours, we extend his work in 
at least two respects. First, we focus on framing contests and on the framing activities 
deployed by proponents and opponents of new institutions. Secondly, we focus more on the 
framing tasks (Benford & Snow, 2000) than on the frame alignment strategy (Snow et al., 
1986) deployed by the proponents of change.  
Without explicitly documenting the cumulative effect of social movement activities with a 
special focus on framing contests, other studies show that a sedimentation mechanism is at 
play in the phenomenon they attempt to describe. For example, Minkoff (1997) shows how 
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the establishment of radical organizations created political opportunities for other groups to 
become activists. Also, the work of Lounsbury et al. (2003) suggests that effort deployed by 
not-for-profit organizations to institutionalize community-based recycling centres led to the 
establishment of the foundations of the for-profit recycling industry. In these examples it is 
clear that sedimentation played a role in the emergence of institution as activists and 
industrials build on existing previous infrastructure to develop their activities. While these 
studies are fundamental to the understanding of the evolution of institutions, they do not put a 
specific emphasis on framing contests. 
Another related concept in the literature is the concept of accretion developed by Nigam and 
Ocasio (2010). Accretion accounts for the fact that fragments of frames (or theorization) 
bundle together to form an institutional logic. However, our cumulative mechanism differs 
from accretion as we are more concerned with how sequence of framing activities and action 
unfold over time than on how master frames (or institutional logics) are created out of 
fragments.  
Effective motivational framing task: Negative individualized evidence-based 
consequences 
Our results suggest that motivational frames play a central role in the resolution of framing 
contests leading to the emergence of institution. Motivational frames which resonated 
sufficiently to make customers exercise their purchasing power showed negative 
individualized evidence-based consequences of buying a Diesel car without the DPF. Because 
this motivational frame was supported by evidence, had negative consequences (i.e. losing 
money) which targeted specific individuals (customers of Diesel cars) and which was not 
counter-framed, we argue that these frames have a higher propensity to resonate. However, 
this motivational frame did not only resonate because of its properties. It is because the 
negative consequences were relevant to the target of the frame and because it sedimented on 
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the two previous phases, namely necessary opening phase and the organizing-mobilizing 
phase. 
In our view, an important part of the current literature does not pay sufficient attention to the 
motivational framing task. Indeed, some important works do not consider this dimension in 
their analysis (e.g., Greenwood et al., 2002; Kaplan, 2008). Those who do mainly focus on 
what motivated people a posteriori (Garud et al., 2002; Maguire et al., 2004; Weber et al., 
2008) rather than investigating the properties of the collective action frames deployed by the 
social movement and which would accomplish a motivational task. In other words, the 
currrent studies do not look at the arguments crafted by the movement. For example, the study 
of Weber et al. (2008) documented the reasons why farmers adopted the grass-fed meat and 
dairy product for their business instead of investigating the collective action frames deployed 
by the social movement.  
However, the work of Benford and Snow (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988; 
Snow et al., 1986) gave interesting insights on what make collective action frames effective. 
They must map onto the values of the targeted groups. Benford and Snow call frame 
alignment strategies the tactics used by social movements to mobilize individuals by aligning 
their frames to individuals’ values and ideologies. However, frame alignment strategies 
neglect the study of the characteristics of frames to make them more influential than others, 
based on an analysis of their potential consequences. Our work shows that looking at potential 
consequences that motivational frames describe is essential to a better understanding of their 
potential to resonate. In addition to a good framing strategy, the social movement has to be 
perceived as credible (Benford & Snow, 2000) and it has to have access to various types of 
resources (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).  
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Institutional creation and the resolution of framing contests 
Since it examines arguments deployed by proponents and opponents of the DPF, our work 
extends the literature by documenting how framing contests lead to institution emergence and 
how framing contests may be resolved. Thus we respond to the calls of scholars for more 
work on the role of social movement in institution creation (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; 
Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008).  
The literature is replete with examples of institutions (Jepperson, 1991). The social movement 
literature has been particularly interested so far in explaining market creation (see for example 
the review of King & Pearce, 2010) and the emergence of organizational forms (Schneiberg & 
Lounsbury, 2008). The literature on institutional entrepreneurship (Hardy & Maguire, 2008) 
and on institutional pluralism (Kraatz & Block, 2008) has been interested in explaining the 
rise of institutional logics and how they compete with existing ones (Lounsbury, 2007; 
Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Finally, with the exception of the work of Garud et al. (2002), the 
emergence of technological standard has attracted far less attention from both the 
institutionalists and the social movement literature. In this study, we looked at the emergence 
of a de facto standard (which emerges bottom up without being imposed), a type of standard 
which, we believe, has not attract much attention so far and its emergence through framing 
contests even less.  
The literature which explores the link between framing contests and the emergence of 
institution can be split into that which studies how framing contests become institutionalized, 
i.e. different competing institutions emerge and endure in time, and that which focuses on 
how framing contests may be resolved by the victory of one clan or the dominance of one 
logic (or master frame) over the others.  
Studies on institutional pluralism clearly attempt to understand how competing logics or 
framing contests emerge and become institutionalized. These studies show that institutional 
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fields are pluralistic and that when there is no possibility of framing contests being resolved, 
the conflict can be institutionalized, taking the form of competing institutional logics (Dunn & 
Jones, 2010; Purdy & Grey, 2009; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000). For example, 
Purdy and Gray (2009) document strategies such as grafting and bridging being used by 
entrepreneurs to develop alternative practices which are institutionalized besides existing ones 
leading to the co-existence of conflicting logics in emerging fields (Purdy & Grey, 2009). 
Dunn and Jones (2010) documented how two institutional logics may be contested. They 
found that plural logics may coexist and the domination of a logic may oscillate over time, 
provided that both logics are necessary for the field: “If distinct logics are needed [such as in 
the medical school training: care versus science] but are advocated by different groups, then 
they may oscillate over time, as a group’s power increases and decreases” (Dunn & Jones: 
140). In this case, a balance between the two logics is necessary to avoid being vulnerable to 
rival groups such as managed care professionals. Another example comes from Weber et al. 
(2008) who show how the social movement contested the current meat and dairy product 
system by proposing as an alternative grass-fed meat and dairy products. The framing contest 
becomes institutionalized instead of being resolved as the creation of grass-fed beef products 
generates more competition with customers having more freedom to choose their dairy and 
meat products. In these papers, framing contests are institutionalized, leading to enduring 
competing institutional logics.  
However, our results are closer to studies which document how framing contests support the 
emergence of one dominant institution to the detriment of others. This pattern has been 
particularly studied in the institutional logic literature where scholars have documented how 
one logic can shift another (Lounsbury, 2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). The study of Nigam 
and W. Ocasio (2010) is particularly interesting as it shows how events can seal the fate of 
alternative institutions. They show that the elimination of political reform models as potential 
alternatives put an end to the framing contests surrounding the reformation of the health care 
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system in the USA and allowed for the establishment of the managed care logic as a dominant 
paradigm in health care. This phenomenon was possible due to the “growing theorization of 
multiple dimensions of a logic of managed care” (p.837) and to the fact that the “new logic is 
congruent with representative features and exemplars in the organizational field” (p.837). Our 
work extends this literature by showing that in addition to growing theorization (or framing) 
of multiple dimensions of a logic, there is also a cumulative mechanism at play which seems 
necessary for frames to perform a motivational task leading to the emergence of an institution.  
Another stream of the literature on cognitive frames (Garud & Rappa, 1994; Kaplan, 2008; 
Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008) is more interested in understanding how convergence and 
dominance of frame emerges. For example, Kaplan (2008) argues that in order to resolve 
framing contests, actors and their frames must be credible and aligned with the interests of 
those they need to mobilize and must at the same time transform the interests of other actors. 
For this author, convergence around a predominant collective frame occurs through 
establishing legitimacy of the claims-makers and realignment of frame with the interests of 
those targeted by framing practices. Our work extends this literature by insisting on the role of 
motivational collective action frames and their characteristics.  
Powerful actors may also intervene in order to resolve framing contests. When two 
entrepreneurs promote different incompatible forms through framing activity, tensions arise 
and an intervention from the state which may push for one organizational form to be adopted 
by several organizations may legitimate one organizational form and put an end to the 
existence of several organizational forms. It is now well documented that a coalition which 
obtains the most important political support is likely to see its frame becoming predominant 
(Brint & Karabel, 1991). Our study suggests that the kind it’s unlikely that the social 
movement could have succeeded without the support of numerous powerful organizations in 
the coalition such WHO, Greenpeace, Friends of Earth, and child-care NGOs.  
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In this study, we examine how framing contests between proponents and opponents of the 
Diesel particulate filter (DPF) in Germany evolved over time to affect institution creation. 
Because our case study and our analysis investigate framing contests in detail, we believe that 
our results can be generalized to other settings having similar characteristics. More 
specifically, we believe that our results can be generalized to settings characterized by intense 
schisms between proponents and opponents to a cause where the establishment of a consensus 
over a norm or a standard is highly perilous. Settings where green technologies are promoted 
by activists such as the case of the catalytic converter in the automotive industry, the 
photovoltaic technology in the energy sector, the commercialization of nanotechnology, 
battles between environmentalists and the oil industry for having lead-free and sulphur-free 
fuel are likely to be characterized by these kinds of framing contests. However, it is clear that 
the themes of the collective action frames and the specific sequence of phases which we 
observed may be specific to our setting. As regard to the phases, we believe that they may 
appear simultaneously instead of sequentially in other settings.  
We call for more work which would take into account the framing activities of both the 
proponents and the opponents involved in framing contests by paying particular attention to 
the properties of motivational framing task which lead to resonance, by theorizing the 
multiplicity of framing contests which characterize institutional wars, and by documenting 
other process patterns leading to the emergence of institution. 
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Table 1. 
Examples of the Coding Table 
Frame task Aggregate theme 
Frame  
(Second order 
themes) 
First order 
themes Polarity Fragments Who? Date Source 
Diagnostic Public 
health 
issues 
Diesel PM is 
likely to be 
harmful for 
human health 
Diesel 
Particulate 
matter can 
cause cancer 
Pro Soot particles from diesel exhaust are becoming smaller and more 
dangerous. The theory stating that these particulates are harmful to 
health when inhaled, and in the worst case can cause cancer, has 
long been disputed among scientists. Now, this theory is proven. 
Scientists 1997-10-11 Der Spiegel 
(weekly) 
Diesel is more 
likely to cause 
cancer 
Pro Today and in the foreseeable future exhaust from diesel engines are 
several times more prone to cause cancer than exhaust from gasoline 
engines.  
Scientists 1999-01-21 Stern  
(weekly) 
No scientific 
evidence that 
Diesel PM is 
noxious for 
human 
Negative effect 
of the diesel 
exhaust on 
human health 
cannot be 
proven 
Con Recent research by the U.S. Health Effects Institute show that 
exhaust from modern diesel engines cannot be related to 
negative health effects on humans  
German car 
industry 
(President 
of Associa-
tion of the 
Automotive 
Industry)
1999-08-22 Welt am 
Sonntag 
(weekly) 
Negative effect 
of the diesel 
exhaust on 
human health 
cannot be 
proven. 
Con Dr. Norbert Metz, BMW AG, […] pointed out that it has not been 
scientifically proven that diesel particulate matters have an effect on 
health. He argues that transferring the results of tests performed on 
rats to humans is questionable. 
German car 
industry 
(Norbert 
Metz from 
BMW) 
2000-04-18 ADAC 
Flughafenge-
spräche 
Prognostic Techno-
logical 
risks & 
benefits 
DPF is a 
solution to 
reduce Diesel 
PM 
Peugeot’s DPF 
technology 
works 
Pro The only remaining problem with modern diesels is the particulates. 
We are proud to announce that we have developed the world's 
first efficient soot particulate filter that comes [...] with the 
Peugeot 607 HDI. 
PSA 
Peugeot / 
ADAC 
(Jean-
Martin Folz, 
CEO of 
PSA)
2000-01-13 Die Zeit 
(weekly) 
Peugeot’s DPF 
technology 
works 
Pro It has been a while since the filter for diesel engines in the Peugeot 
607 proved to be successful. The tests show that even after 80 000 
kilometres, the filter was still working as good as a new one. For a 
little extra manufacturing cost, the filter should be able to eliminate 
99.9% of fine particulates. 
 
Federal 
Environ-
ment 
Agency  
(UBA) & 
ADAC
2001-09-30 Die Welt 
(daily) 
53 
53/60 
Table 1 (continued). 
Examples of our Coding Table 
Frame task Aggregate theme 
Frame  
(Second order 
themes) 
First order 
themes Polarity Fragments Who Date Source 
Prognostic Techno-
logical 
risks & 
benefits 
DPF is not a 
good solution 
to reduce 
Diesel PM 
Discredit DPF 
technology. 
Con By using diesel particulate filters, we resolve one problem to create 
another one [...] as it is increasing consumption and CO2 emissions. 
German car 
industry 
(president 
of 
Mercedes)
2001-11-19 Der Spiegel 
(weekly) 
Discredit 
Peugeot’s DPF 
technology  
Con This is just marketing campaign of the French. German car 
industry 
2003-02-26 Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
(daily) 
Motivational Economic 
risks and 
benefits 
Devaluation of 
the diesel cars 
without filter 
Cars without 
DPF will lose 
in value 
Pro Customers who buy cars with an older technology will be 
disappointed as the loss of value for diesel cars without particulate 
filters will be high in the next few years. 
Environ-
mental 
Movement 
2004-01-26 DPA  
(press agency) 
Cars without 
DPF will lose 
in value 
Pro New cars without particles filters will dramatically lose 
their reselling value 
German 
Environmen
tal Aid 
(Jürgen  
Resch)
2004-07-15 Die Welt 
(daily) 
The value of 
diesel cars will 
not change 
without filter 
Counter-
argument to 
“Cars without 
DFP will lose 
in value” 
Con The rumours pretending that cars without soot filters will lose 
1000 € per vehicle do not match the facts. 
German car 
industry 
2005-05-17 Börsen-
Zeitung 
(daily) 
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Table 2. 
Frames and Counter-Frames Promoting the DPF: January 1985 – October 2002 
Date Aggregate Themes 
Framing 
tasks 
Proponents 
frames 
Opponents 
counter-frames 
January 
1985 – 
October 
1999 
Public Health 
issues 
Diagnostic Diesel particulates cause important 
health problems, are probably 
carcinogenic, lead to inflammatory 
processes, etc. 
 
Enters the bloodstream and brain 
 
Soot has no effect on health 
 
No evidence that soot increases cancer 
risks 
 Risks and 
benefits of the 
technology 
Prognostic Filters would be a response to lower soot 
particulate emissions 
Technological infeasibility 
 
Lean-burn engine is a better alternative 
technology 
 
Filters are too expensive to produce 
November 
1999 
Risks and 
benefits of the 
technology 
Prognostic Diesel cars of German manufacturers are 
polluting 
 
Peugeot's cars are clean because they are 
equipped with the DPF 
 
Filters are a proven solution to lower 
Diesel PM emissions 
 
 
 
Due to additive, Peugeot's technology is 
even more polluting 
 
Peugeot uses the DPF to compensate its 
ineffective Euro 3 Diesel engines 
 
French technology is ineffective 
 
Internal engine methods are a better 
alternative technology 
March 2000 Public health 
issues 
Diagnostic Diesel particulates cause important 
health problems (probably carcinogenic, 
lead to inflammatory processes) 
 
Enters the bloodstream and brain 
Lack of scientific evidence supporting 
detrimental health effects 
October 
2000 –
August 
2001 
Risks and 
benefits of the 
technology 
Prognostic / 
Diagnostic 
ADAC experiment preliminary and final 
results show that DPFs are effective in 
limiting Diesel soot particulate 
emissions 
  
October – 
November 
2001 
Economic 
risks and 
benefits 
Motivational DPFs do not increase fuel consumption DPFs increase fuel consumption 
March 2002 Public Health 
issues 
Diagnostic Diesel particulates cause important 
health problems (cancer, throat, lung and 
cardiac problems) 
 
Diesel soot particulates penetrate the 
body (the circulation system, the brain) 
Soot has no effect on health  
September 
2002 
Risks and 
benefits of the 
technology 
Prognostic DPF is an effective technology 
 
DPF is the best available technology 
 
Car manufacturers could instantly equip 
all their cars with DPFs 
 
If the French car manufacturers can do 
it, so should the Germans. 
Internal engine methods are a better 
alternative technology 
September/ 
October 
2002 
Regulatory 
Intervention 
Motivational Tax incentives should be introduced 
 
Current emission standards are 
inappropriate 
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Table 3. 
Frames and Counter-Frames Promoting the DPF: November 2002 – February 2004 
Date Aggregate Themes 
Framing 
tasks 
Proponents 
frames 
Opponents 
counter-frames 
November 
2002 
Cohesion/ 
fragmentation 
Motivational Bringing members of different 
organizational field together 
 
December 
2002 
Risks and 
benefits of the 
technology 
Prognostic Filter is effective, even children can 
show it (the experiment) 
 
 Behaviour 
(in)appropria-
teness 
Motivational 
Not taking into account evidence that 
the DPF is effective is irresponsible 
The experiment was inappropriate 
because it involved children 
 Public health 
issues 
Diagnostic Increases the number of deaths 
 
Poses high risks for children  
 Economic risks 
and benefits 
Motivational Filter decreases fuel consumption Filter increases fuel consumption 
February 
2003 
Economic risks 
and benefits 
 
Cohesion/ 
fragmentation 
 
 
Behaviour 
(in)appropria-
teness 
Prognostic 
 
 
Motivational 
 
 
 
Motivational 
 
 
 
Movement is ready to support car 
manufacturers which would use filters 
 
 
Symbolically penalizing those who do 
not use filters 
Consumers have no willingness to pay 
for environment-friendly products 
 
Ford Germany asked for red card like 
the other car manufacturers to preserve 
solidarity 
 
German industry reacts by sanctioning 
players who are ready to collaborate 
with the movement 
March 2003 Risks and 
benefits of the 
technology 
Prognostic The DPF is an effective technology Alternative technology is better 
July 2003 Regulatory 
intervention 
issues 
Motivational Taxes on Diesel cars or taxes on Diesel
fuel should be increased 
 
Law should enforce DPF 
Taxes on Diesel cars or taxes on Diesel
fuel will not be increased 
  Public health 
issues 
Diagnostic Study published by the government 
shows that 14000 people die ahead of 
their time in Germany due to Diesel 
fine particulates  
  Behaviour 
(in)appropria-
teness 
Motivational   Saying that 14000 Germans are dying 
every year due to Diesel soot is pure 
panic mongering 
  Public health 
issues 
Prognostic DPFs would increase the life 
expectation in Germany by 1 to 3 
month  
August 
2003 
Cohesion/ 
fragmentation 
Motivational   Car manufacturer D has the filter, but 
does not want to be the first mover. 
 
Car suppliers support the movement 
 
German car manufacturers threatened 
filter suppliers to terminate their 
contracts if they collaborate 
  Public health 
issues  
Diagnostic Diesel PM causes important health 
problems 
  
September 
2003 
Economic risks 
and benefits 
Motivational   We [industry] will do what the market 
asks 
February 
2004 
Public health 
issues 
Diagnostic 8500 people die ahead of their time in 
Germany 
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Table 4. 
Frames and Counter-Frames Promoting the DPF: March 2004 – June 2005 
Date Aggregate Themes 
Framing 
tasks 
Proponents 
frames 
Opponents 
counter-frames 
March 
2004 
Public health 
issues 
Diagnostic Science has proven that soot 
particulates cause health problems 
  
  Risks and 
benefits of 
the 
technology 
Prognostic DPF technology is effective   
April 2004 Public health 
issues 
Diagnostic Diesel PM causes important health 
problems 
  
June 2004 Regulatory 
intervention 
issues 
Motivational Tax incentives favouring the 
introduction of the DPF might resolve 
the problem of soot particulate 
Tax incentives might kill the Diesel car 
industry in Germany 
 
Tax incentives might kill alternative 
technology 
July 2004 Economic 
risks and 
benefits 
Motivational Cars without filter will drop 
dramatically in value 
  
March 
2005 
Public health 
issues 
Diagnostic Diesel particulates cause important 
health problems such lung cancer and 
heart problems 
 
65’000 people die ahead of their time 
due to air pollution caused by fine 
particulate matter 
Diesel particulates are only a small part 
of the fine particulate matter pollution 
problem 
  
Regulatory 
intervention 
issues 
Motivational Ban cars without filter in inner cities 
  
  Cohesion/ 
fragmentation 
Motivational To protect the German automotive 
OEM, the German government delayed 
the introduction of tight thresholds 
  
  Risks and 
benefits of 
the 
technology 
Prognostic Filters are effective   
  
Regulatory 
intervention 
issues 
Motivational 
  
The tax debate has negative effects on 
the buying behaviour of the consumers
 
Regulation would have negative effects 
on German car industry 
May 2005 Economic 
risks and 
benefits 
Motivational Cars without filters will lose 
dramatically in value 
A loss of 1000 EUR in resale price is 
exaggerated 
  
Public health 
issues 
Diagnostic   Diesel particulates are only a small part 
of the fine particulate matter pollution 
problem 
  
Regulatory 
intervention 
issues 
Motivational The filter technology will only 
penetrate the market if there are tax 
incentives 
Regulation would have negative effects 
on German car industry 
June 2005 Behaviour 
(in)appropria-
teness     
Mr Y is a trouble-maker for the car 
industry 
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Table 5. 
Framing Polarization 
Aggregate 
Themes 
Actors 
position 1985 – 1999 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Public health 
issues 
(Diagnostic 
framing tasks) 
Proponents
Involved in cancer Involved in cancer Involved in cancer Involved in cancer Number of deaths 
increases 
High risk for 
children 
14'000 deaths     
Opponents
Lack of evidence Lack of evidence Lack of evidence Lack of evidence 
Evidence is biased 
due to studies on rat 
Lack of evidence 
Evidence is biased 
due to studies on rat 
Inappropriate 
behaviour (panic 
mongering) 
    
Risks and 
benefits of the 
technology 
(Prognostic 
framing tasks) 
Proponents
Filter as a potential 
solution 
With Peugeot, filter 
is a commercialized 
solution 
Some evidence 
from the 
Automobile Club 
(ADAC) 
Solid evidence from 
the Automobile Club 
(ADAC) 
        
Opponents
Filter is an 
ineffective 
technology 
Peugeot's filter 
pollutes more 
            
Economic  
risks and 
benefits 
(Motivational 
framing tasks) 
Proponents   
   Filter does not 
increase fuel 
consumption 
(no cost having a 
filter) 
Filter does not 
increase fuel 
consumption 
Filter does not 
increase fuel 
consumption 
Without filter, the value 
of a car drops 
(Not having a filter has 
an important cost) 
Without filter, 
the value of a car 
drops 
Opponents
      Filter increases fuel 
consumption 
(Having a filter has a 
cost) 
Filter increases fuel 
consumption 
Filter increases 
fuel consumption 
Filter does not affect the 
value of cars (Not 
having a filter doesn't 
affect the reselling 
price) 
Filter does not 
affect the value 
of cars 
Regulation 
intervention 
issues 
(Motivational 
framing tasks) 
Proponents
        Tax incentives 
favouring 
introduction of filter 
Tax incentives 
favouring 
introduction of 
filter 
Tax incentives 
favouring introduction 
of filter 
  
Opponents
          There is no need 
for tax because 
filters are not 
necessary 
Tax will kill the auto 
industry 
 
Tax may kill the lean-
burn engine technology 
  
   Frame Polarization 
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Table 6. 
The Cumulation of Phases 
Date January 1985 November 2002 June 2004 
Phases Necessary Opening Organizing-Mobilizing Instrumentalization of Channels 
Aggregate 
Themes 
Public health 
issues 
Technology 
risks and 
benefits 
Cohesion / 
fragmentation 
Behaviour 
appropriateness 
Economic 
risks and 
benefits 
Regulative  
issues 
Cumulative 
effect 
      
      
      
 
 
